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In the previous contribution, which carried out a detailed analysis of the principal purpose test (PPT), the author had indicated that interesting
issues arise with respect to the interaction of the PPT (and the guiding principle) with other treaty based or domestic based anti-avoidance rules. In
this contribution, the author, firstly, discusses the interaction of the test with the inherent anti-abuse rule. Secondly, the author discusses the
relationship of this test with existing treaty general anti-avoidance rules (GAARs) and specific anti-avoidance rules (SAARs) such as the
limitation of benefits clause, the beneficial ownership clause, holding/time period provisions introduced in the articles dealing with dividends/capital
gains as well as the anti-abuse rule with respect to permanent establishments in a third State. Lastly, the author analyses the interaction of the
PPT with domestic anti-avoidance rules such as judicial doctrines, statutory GAARs and SAARs. It is pertinent to note that this contribution
should be read in conjunction with the author’s previous contribution published in the January edition of the journal.
1 INTRODUCTION
1. In the previous contribution, which carried out a
detailed analysis of the principal purpose test (PPT),
the author had indicated that interesting issues arise
with respect to the interaction of the PPT (and the
guiding principle) with other treaty based or domestic
based anti-avoidance rules. In this contribution, the
author, firstly, discusses the interaction of the test
with the inherent anti-abuse rule (see section 2).
Secondly, the author discusses the relationship of
this test with existing treaty general anti-avoidance
rules (GAARs) and specific anti-avoidance rules
(SAARs) such as the limitation of benefits (LOBs)
clause, the beneficial ownership clause, holding/time
period provisions introduced in the articles dealing
with dividends/capital gains as well as the anti-abuse
rule with respect to permanent establishments (PEs)
in a third State (see section 3). Lastly, the author
analyses the interaction of the PPT with domestic
anti-avoidance rules such as judicial doctrines, statu-
tory GAARs and SAARs (see section 4). Finally, the
author concludes (see section 5). It is pertinent to note
that this contribution should be read in conjunction
with the author’s previous contribution published in
the preceding edition of the journal.
2 THE INHERENT ANTI-ABUSE RULE
2. Article 38(1)(c) of the UN Statute of the
International Court of Justice provides that the
Court shall apply ‘the general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations’ to the submitted disputes.
It is argued that such ‘general principles of law’ are a
source of international law. Consequently, such
principles should be taken into consideration to
interpret tax treaties. Specifically, it is argued that
the ‘abuse of rights’ doctrine can be considered as a
‘general principle of law’ for the purposes of Article
38(1)(c) and thus can be used to interpret tax trea-
ties. This is because several civil law countries and
International Courts have developed and applied
the ‘abuse of rights’ doctrine in non-tax law and tax
law cases. Alternatively, it is argued that an anti-
abuse doctrine in tax matters exists at the level of
international law independently of whether the
abuse of rights doctrine exists at the level of inter-
national law. This is primarily because the domestic
laws of several States contain domestic anti-avoid-
ance rules. Thus, as there is a unanimous acceptance
of anti-abuse rules, such rules meet the require-
ments of Article 38(1)(c). Furthermore, on an inde-
pendent footing, it has also been argued that the
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principle of ‘good faith’ enshrined in Article 26 or
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention of the Law
on Treaties (VCLT) includes the prohibition of
abuse. Accordingly, by referring to Article 38(1)
(c) and/or the principle of ‘good faith’, it is con-
tended that an ‘inherent anti-abuse rule’ exists in tax
treaties and that rule can counter treaty abuse (such
as treaty shopping or rule shopping). However,
commentators1 and national courts2 seem to be
divided in their opinion on the existence and appli-
cation of such an anti-abuse rule to tax treaties. In
the author’s opinion, such a rule does not exist
given its undefined nature and therefore cannot be
used to counter treaty abuse.3 Moreover, even if it is
demonstrated that such a rule exists (as it is applied
in certain States) and a tax treaty contains the PPT,
in the author’s opinion, the treaty PPT will prevail
over the inherent anti-abuse rule. This is because
the treaty PPT is a written anti-avoidance rule and
can be considered to be a ‘lex specialis’ in comparison
to the unwritten anti-abuse rule.4
3 TREATY ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULES
3.1 Treaty GAARs
3. Article 7(2)5 of theMultilateral Instrument (MLI),
the compatibility clause, provides that the PPT shall be
included ‘in place of or in the absence of’ similar provisions
of all Covered Tax Agreements.6 This means that the
PPT will replace existing treaty GAARs that apply to
deny all treaty benefits7 or benefits sought under
selected provisions.8 Moreover, this also means that
the PPT will be added to tax treaties that do not
contain any treaty GAARs.9 If the relevant tax treaty
would incorporate the PPT, then, in the opinion of the
author, there is no need to resort to the guiding prin-
ciple that is derived from the commentary.
3.2 Treaty SAARs
3.2.1 Introductory Comments
4. If one applies the interpretation doctrine of lex
specialis derogat legi generali then the treaty SAARs
should prevail over the guiding principle (which is
derived from the commentary) when such anti-abuse
rules apply to similar fact patterns. A similar out-
come should have applied in the context of the PPT.
However, the PPT applies ‘notwithstanding the other
provisions of this Convention’. By using a non-obstante
clause the PPT becomes a self-standing (overriding)
provision and applies even if the transaction under-
taken by the taxpayer passes the tests of the treaty
SAARs such as the LOB clause10 or the beneficial
ownership clause (found in Articles 10, 11 and 12
OECD Model)11 or the other SAAR’s introduced
through the MLI viz., Article 8, Article 9 or
Article 10 of the MLI. This is surely an unreasonable
outcome.12 In line with the position expressed with
respect to the guiding principle, the author’s opinion
is that the transaction/arrangement can be analysed
under the PPT only when the treaty SAAR does not
cover the factual situation at stake.13 This is
explained below.
Notes
1 Concurring with the existence: Ward, Abuse, at 18–26; Vogel, Commentary, at 125; Engelen, Good Faith, at 36. Dissenting with the existence: Van Weeghel, Thesis, at
98–102; De Broe, Thesis, at 302–316; Chand, Thesis, s. 21.3.1.1.
2 Accepted: Swiss Supreme Court in A Holding ApS v. Federal Tax Administration, 8 ITLR 536, 536–562 (28 Nov. 2005) and District Court of Tel Aviv-Yafo: Yanko-Weiss
Holdings Ltd v. Holon Assessing Office, 10 ITLR 524, 524–550 (30 Dec. 2007). Rejected: Vodafone International Holdings B.V. vs Union of India, Civil Appeal No.733 of 20
Jan. 2012 and MIL (Investments) SA v. Canada, 9 ITLR 25 (18 Aug. 2006).
3 See Chand, Thesis, s. 21.3.1.1.
4 De Broe, EU Law, at 226.
5 2016 OECD, Multilateral Convention, Art. 7(2).
6 See 2016 OECD, Explanatory Statement to the Multilateral Convention, paras 93–96.
7 Several tax treaties concluded by India contain a treaty GAAR that could deny all benefits under a tax treaty. See India, MLI Position, at 26–27. These provisions will
be replaced by the PPT. For instance, the limitation of benefit provision contained in Art. 28(C), India–UK Tax Treaty (1993 as updated with the 2013 protocol) or
Art. 29(2–3), India-Luxembourg Tax Treaty (2008) will be replaced by the PPT. Although these provisions are called limitation of benefit provisions, in principle,
they are treaty GAARs.
8 Several tax treaties concluded by the UK include ‘main purpose tests’, especially, with respect to articles that deal with dividends, interest and royalties. See UK, MLI Position,
at 37–40. These provisions will be replaced by the PPT. For instance, the anti-conduit provision contained in Art. 3(1)(n), UK–US Tax Treaty (2001) will be replaced with
the PPT if the US signs the MLI.
9 Several tax treaties concluded by the Netherlands do not have Treaty GAARs. See Dutch, MLI Position, at 26–27. The PPT will be added to Dutch tax treaties. For instance,
the PPT will be added to the India-Netherlands Tax Treaty (1988 as updated with the 2012 protocol).
10 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 8.
11 The clause can be considered to be an anti-avoidance clause. See 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 1, para. 63; De Broe & Luts, BEPS, at 133.
12 Lang, PPT rule, at 655; De Broe, Luts, BEPS, at 133.
13 The author is currently undertaking further research with respect to the scope of non-obstante clauses.
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3.2.2 PPT and LOB
5. Assume that the R–S tax treaty has a PPT and
the simplified LOB14 in all the examples discussed
in this section as a result of the MLI. Moreover, State
R exempts dividend income from taxation under its
domestic law through a participation exemption
regime whereas interest income is taxed at the nor-
mal corporate tax rate (for instance,12.5%). State S
imposes a 25% domestic withholding tax on passive
income (dividends and interest).
6. Consider the following situation. A pure holding
company – RCO, resident of State R, which is wholly
owned by TCO, a resident of a third State (State T – a
State that does not have a tax treaty with State S), will
not satisfy the LOB clause. Specifically, the holding
company will not be a ‘qualified person’ for the purpose
of Article 7(9) of the MLI,15 it may not satisfy the
active conduct test as a result of Article 7(10)(i) of the
MLI16 and it will not satisfy the derivative benefit test
contained in Article 7(11) of the MLI17 (as it is owned
by residents of a third State i.e. by non-equivalent
beneficiaries). Therefore, this entity will be denied
treaty benefits with respect to dividend related
income that stems from its participations in compa-
nies that are residents of State S. In this situation, the
LOB clause will take precedence to deny treaty access
and the PPT (or guiding principle) will not apply.18
7. Changing the facts, consider another situation
where a tax treaty exists between State T and State S
and that treaty provides for benefits similar to the R–
S tax treaty with respect to dividend related income
(both treaties exempt dividend income from source
taxation). In this case, the pure holding company
(RCO), which does not satisfy Article 7(9) or Article
7(10)(i), may satisfy Article 7(11)19 of the simplified
LOB (that deals with derivative benefits) as it is
owned by an equivalent beneficiary20 viz., TCO (ben-
eficiary in State T that would have been entitled to a
similar treaty benefit had it invested directly). In this
situation, this entity will be granted treaty benefits
under Article 7(11) with respect to dividend related
income that flows from its participations in compa-
nies that are residents of State S. Can the PPT be
applied by State S to the holding company to deny
treaty benefits? In the author’s opinion, the PPT
should not apply to a fact pattern that falls under
the scope of the LOB and in such situations the
interpretation doctrine of lex specialis derogat legi gen-
erali should continue to apply21 (the guiding principle
should definitely not apply). Even if the PPT is
applied and the subjective element gets satisfied (as
the sole purpose for the holding company is to obtain
treaty benefits), the author’s opinion is that the tax-
payer may be able to establish that it has acted in
accordance with the ‘object and purpose of the relevant
provisions’ read in light of the treaties preamble (objec-
tive element). Specifically, the taxpayer may argue
that it acts in accordance with the relevant provisions
of the derivative benefits clause. Moreover, it may be
able to establish that this situation does not represent
a treaty shopping case that entails passing the income
for the benefit of third State residents. In other words,
both treaties (R–S and T–S) offer equal protection and
investing with or without the holding company
would not make a difference with respect to taxes
levied in State S. The argument that the taxpayer
does not pay any taxes under domestic tax law of
State R (pursuant to the domestic participation
exemption) should not be relevant to the application
of the PPT in this situation as a benefit under the
domestic law would fall outside the scope of the PPT.
8. Moving on, consider the facts contained in Example
F22 to the commentary on anti-conduits. In that case,
RCO, an operational financing entity, is owned by a
resident of State T. State T does not have a tax treaty
with State S. In this situation, RCO will not be a
‘qualified person’ for the purpose of Article 7(9), it may
not satisfy the active conduct test as a result of Article 7
(10)(iii)23 as it provides intra group financing and it will
Notes
14 For instance, the PPT and Simplified LOB will be added to the India-Denmark Tax Treaty (1989 as amended subsequently).
15 2016 OECD, Multilateral Convention, Art. 7(9).
16 2016 OECD, Multilateral Convention, Art. 7(10); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 73.
17 2016 OECD, Multilateral Convention, Art. 7(11).
18 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 3); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 171.
19 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 82 and para. 87.
20 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, paras 128–130.
21 Danon & Salome, MLI, s. 3.7.1.
22 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 19, Example F); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 187, Example F.
23 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 73.
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not satisfy the derivative benefit test contained in Article
7(11) of the MLI (as it is owned by non-equivalent
beneficiaries). Assume that RCO applies for discretion-
ary relief under Article 7(12) of the MLI and the com-
petent authorities agree to extend the relief based on
non-tax reasons.24 Can the PPT be applied to deny treaty
benefits? In the author’s opinion, once again, the inter-
pretation doctrine of lex specialis derogat legi generali
should continue to apply25 with the result that the
PPT is not applicable (the guiding principle should
definitely not apply). At the outset, it will be extremely
absurd if the State S local tax authorities apply the PPT
to deny treaty benefits that have been granted by the
competent authorities. Even if applied, as demonstrated
in the previous contribution, the subjective element of
the PPT will not be satisfied with respect to this fact
pattern (see section 4.3.2.5 of the previous contribution).
Furthermore, the author’s opinion is that the taxpayer
may be able to establish that it has acted in accordance
with the ‘object and purpose of the relevant provisions’
read in light of the treaties preamble (objective element).
Specifically, the taxpayer may argue that it acts in
accordance with the relevant provisions of the discre-
tionary relief clause (which grants benefits only when
non-tax reasons exist).
9. On the other hand, the PPT (or guiding principle)
could be applied to fact patterns that are not caught by
the LOB. For example, a listed financial institution, a
State R resident, will always satisfy the LOB clause i.e.
it is a qualified person within the meaning of Article 7
(9)(c) of the MLI. Assume that the financial institution
enters into a conduit financing arrangement with the
sole purpose of avoiding taxes in the State of source for
the benefit of third State residents (State T – a State
that does not have a treaty with State S). In these
circumstances, it cannot be argued that the PPT (or
guiding principle) cannot be applied to the conduit
financing arrangement (the arrangement represents an
additional factual pattern) with the effect that the
treaty benefit will be denied.26
10. This being said, the outcome could be different
if we assume that State T has a tax treaty with State S
that provides for equivalent benefits with respect to
interest related income (both treaties exempt interest
income from source taxation). If the PPT is applied
and the subjective element gets satisfied (as the sole
purpose is to obtain treaty benefits), the author’s
opinion is that the taxpayer may be able to establish
that it has acted in accordance with the ‘object and
purpose of the relevant provisions’ read in light of the
treaties preamble (objective element). Specifically,
the taxpayer may be able to establish that this situa-
tion does not represent a treaty shopping case that
entails passing the income for the benefit of third
State residents.27 In other words, both treaties offer
equal protection and investing with or without the
financing arrangement would not make a difference
with respect to taxes levied in State S.28 The argu-
ment that the taxpayer pays low corporate income
taxes under the domestic tax law of State R (for
instance, on the interest spread) should not be relevant
to the application of the PPT in this situation.
3.2.3 PPT and Beneficial Ownership
11. The commentary to the PPT indicates that
the PPT could be applied to a ‘resident of the other
State (who is the beneficial owner) under Article 10, 11
or 12’.29
12. It is clear that agents and nominees (for
instance, individuals or companies) cannot be
regarded as ‘beneficial owners’ as they receive income
on behalf of others.30 In these situations, the PPT
should not be applied as the ‘beneficial owner’ clause
will tackle treaty abuse issues with respect to the
income collected by agent and nominees. For
instance, see the discussion in the previous contribu-
tion (see section 4.3.2.11 of the contribution) with
respect to Example I31 that deals with the collection
of royalties by a management association.
Notes
24 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, paras 101–112.
25 DANON, SALOME, MLI, s. 3.7.1.
26 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 7); 2017 OECDComm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 175.
27 Arguably, the objective test of the anti-conduit rule contained in Art. 3(1)(n) of the 2001 US–UK tax treaty will also not be satisfied to this fact pattern. Hence, treaty
benefits should be extended.
28 The HMRC seems to adopt a similar position in treaty shopping cases. See Examples 7 and 8 discussed in HMRC, Double taxation claims and applications – Beneficial
ownership, INTM 332080.
29 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 3); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 171.
30 2014 OECD Comm. Art. 10, para. 12.2.
31 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 14, Example I); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 182, Example I.
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13. It is less clear whether intermediaries
(companies or other similar taxpayers), that receive
passive income on their own behalf and forward all
or a certain percentage of that income to others
(through dividends or deductible expenses), qualify
as ‘beneficial owners’32? Although discussing the con-
cept of ‘beneficial owner’ is beyond the scope of this
contribution, the author states that international
consensus does not seem to exist on this issue33 as
some jurisdictions adopt a formal/legal approach
(such as Canada34) whereas others adopt a more
economic substance oriented approach (such as
Switzerland35) to interpret this clause. In the
author’s opinion, the concept of ‘beneficial ownership’
should receive a narrow formal/legal meaning.36 The
narrow meaning would exclude agents and nominees
(as the income is not paid to them)37 but not com-
panies that receive income on their own behalf and
are taxable on the income (this does not mean that
the clause should not be read as a subject to tax
clause38). In fact, several fact patterns that have
been litigated before Courts in light of the ‘beneficial
ownership’ clause are now discussed in the commen-
tary to the PPT. For instance, refer to the discussion
in the previous contribution with respect to Example
A39 and Example B40 to the PPT as well as Example
C41 and Example E42 to the commentary on anti-
conduits (see sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.2.6 of the previous
contribution). This development clearly indicates that
treaty abuse issues with respect to intermediary com-
panies (or arrangements with intermediary compa-
nies) should be analysed under the PPT (or the
guiding principle) as opposed to the beneficial own-
ership clause.43Thus, the role of the beneficial own-
ership clause in countering treaty abuse will
diminish going forward.
3.2.4 PPT and Other SAARs
3.2.4.1 Provision Countering Abusive Dividend
Transfers
14. Refer to the facts in example E44 to the PPT.
Moving away from those facts slightly; assume that
RCO purchases the shares of the distributing com-
pany from another shareholder (Mr X) with the sole
intention to benefit from the reduced rate of 5%
provided under Article 10(2)(a). After receiving the
dividends, RCO immediately sells the shares back to
Mr X. The commentary on Article 10 of the OECD
Model provides that ‘the reduction envisaged in subpar-
agraph a) of paragraph 2 should not be granted in cases of
abuse of this provision, for example, where a company with
a holding of less than 25 per cent has, shortly before the
dividends become payable, increased its holding primarily
for the purpose of securing the benefits.45 The PPT could
apply to the case and RCO could be denied treaty
benefits.46
Notes
32 The commentary provides that ‘a conduit company cannot normally be regarded as the beneficial owner if, though the formal owner, it has, as a practical matter, very narrow powers which
render it, in relation to the income concerned, a mere fiduciary or administrator acting on account of the interested parties’. See 2014 OECD Comm. Art. 10, para. 12.3.
33 Danon & Salome, MLI, s. 3.7.4; De Broe, Thesis, at 713.
34 Arnold, Beneficial Ownership, at 44–48.
35 Danon & Salome, MLI, s. 3.7.4.2.
36 Ibid., s. 3.7.4.3.
37 For a discussion on the concept of ‘paid to’ see Sanghavi, Thesis, Ch. 5, s. 2.2.2.
38 See Chand, Thesis, s. 21.4.
39 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 14, Example A); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 182, Example A. Also see 1994 Royal
Dutch Oil Company/Marketmaker judgment. For a detailed analysis of the judgment see De Broe, Thesis, at 694–697; Smit, Beneficial Ownership, at 61–75; Ringler, Beneficial
Ownership, at 222–223.
40 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 14, Example B); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 182, Example B. Also see the 2006
Bank of Scotland judgment. For a detailed analysis of the judgment see: De Broe, Thesis, at 697–702; Chand, Thesis, s. 13.4.10; Gutmann, Beneficial Ownership, at 167–182;
Ringler, Beneficial Ownership, at 233–235.
41 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 19, Example C); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 187, Example C. The example seems
to contain a mixture of facts discussed in the 1971 Aiken Industries case and the 1997 Northern Indiana Public Service case. See Aiken Industries, Inc vs Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 56 TC 925, August 5th 1971 and US Court of Appeals for Seventh Circuit: Northern Indiana Public Service Company v. Commissioner, 115 F3d 506, June 6th 1997.
42 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 19, Example E); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 187, Example E; Also see the
discussion on the US SDI Netherlands (1996) case in Brauner, Beneficial Ownership, at 149–154; Ringler, Beneficial Ownership, at 207–208. Also see the Velcro Canada Case
(2012) in Arnold, Beneficial Ownership, at 44–48; Ringler, Beneficial Ownership, at 229–230.
43 See De Broe, Thesis, at 714. The commentator had suggested that the issue of conduit companies should be addressed through the adoption of the LOB clause or a main
purpose test as opposed to the beneficial owner clause.
44 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 14, Example E); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 182, Example E.
45 2014 OECD Comm. Art. 10, para. 17.
46 2011 UN Comm. Art. 1, paras 94–95.
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15. Now assume that the R–S tax treaty contains
the clause proposed by Article 8(1) of the MLI.47
The clause introduces a holding period of 365 days.
After purchasing the shares, RCO receives the divi-
dends, holds onto the shares of the distributing
entity for one year and then sells them back to Mr
X. State S will not be able to refuse access to the
lower rate of 5% as RCO has complied with the
holding period. Therefore, the treaty SAAR will
not apply. The question is whether the PPT can
apply to the same fact pattern? The term ‘notwith-
standing’ would indicate that the PPT will also
apply. However, as stated earlier, the interpretation
doctrine of lex specialis derogat legi generali should
continue to apply when such anti-abuse rules apply
to similar fact patterns48 (the guiding principle
should definitely not apply). Even if the subjective
element of the PPT gets satisfied, the author’s opi-
nion is that the taxpayer may be able to establish
that it has acted in accordance with the ‘object and
purpose of the relevant provisions’ (objective ele-
ment). Specifically, the taxpayer may argue that it
acts in accordance with the relevant provisions deal-
ing with countering abusive dividend transfers and
thus the PPT should not apply. In other words, the
abusive, artificial or tax avoidance element switches off
as the taxpayer complies with the holding period.
3.2.4.2 Provision Countering Avoidance of
Capital Gains on Sale of Real Estate
16. Consider the following example: A resident
individual investor, Mr X, of State R owns shares
in a State S company viz., B Corp that owns only
moveable and immoveable property. The shares
derive 49% of their value from moveable property
and 51% from immoveable property. If Mr X sells
the shares of B Corp, then his gain will be taxed
in State S pursuant to Article 13(4) of the OECD
Model which provides that, ‘Gains derived by a
resident of a Contracting State from the alienation of
shares deriving more than 50 per cent of their value
directly or indirectly from immovable property situated
in the other Contracting State may be taxed in that
other State’.49 In order to avoid State S taxes, Mr X
injects cash into B Corp (through an increase of
share capital). The addition of liquid assets
increases the value of the moveable property to
51% and reduces the value of immoveable prop-
erty to 49%. Mr X sells the shares soon after
injecting the cash. In this situation the PPT
would surely apply, as the sole purpose for Mr X
to inject cash, immediately before the sale, is to
circumvent taxes in State S.50
17. Now assume that the R–S tax treaty has
adopted the clause proposed by Article 9(1) of the
MLI.51 The clause introduces a time period of 365
days. After injecting the cash, Mr X holds onto the
shares of B Corp for one year. Thereafter, he makes
the sale. The value of immoveable property remains
the same throughout that one year. State S will not be
in a position to tax the gain as less than 50% of the
sale value is attributable to the immoveable property.
Therefore, the treaty SAAR will not apply. The ques-
tion is whether the PPT can apply to the same fact
pattern? The term ‘notwithstanding’ would indicate
that the PPT will also apply. However, as stated
earlier, the interpretation doctrine of lex specialis dero-
gat legi generali should continue to apply when such
anti-abuse rules apply to similar fact patterns52 (the
guiding principle should definitely not apply). Even if
the subjective element of the PPT gets satisfied, the
author’s opinion is that the taxpayer may be able to
establish that it has acted in accordance with the
‘object and purpose of the relevant provisions’ (objec-
tive element). Specifically, the taxpayer may argue
that it acts in accordance with the relevant provisions
dealing with countering avoidance of capital gains on
the sale of shares of real estate companies and thus the
PPT should not apply. In other words, the abusive,
artificial or tax avoidance element switches off as the
taxpayer complies with the time period.
Notes
47 2016 OECD, Multilateral Convention, Art. 8(1). It should be noted that this clause is an optional clause that States may wish to apply to their Covered Tax Agreements. See
2016 OECD, Explanatory Statement to the Multilateral Convention, para. 125. Only a few countries have opted for this clause with respect to their covered tax
agreements. For instance, see the positions adopted by Argentina, Australia, Belgium, China, India and Russia.
48 Danon & Salome, MLI, s. 3.7.3.
49 2014 OECD Model, Art. 13(4).
50 2011 UN Comm. Art. 1, paras 97–99.
51 2016 OECD, Multilateral Convention, Art. 9(1). It should be noted that this clause is an optional clause that States may wish to apply to their Covered Tax Agreements. See
2016 OECD, Explanatory Statement to the Multilateral Convention, para. 136. A few countries have opted for this clause with respect to their covered tax
agreements. For instance, see the positions adopted by Argentina, Australia, Belgium and China.
52 Danon & Salome, MLI, s. 3.7.3.
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3.2.4.3 Anti-Abuse Rule for Third
State Permanent Establishments
18. Consider the following example: A resident of
State R that carries out an operating business, RCO,
derives interest income from SCO in State S. The
interest income is attributable to RCOs PE in State
T.53 The corporate tax rate in State R and State T are
25% and 9%, respectively. The domestic withhold-
ing tax rate in State S on interest income is 30%.
The R–S treaty provision dealing with interest pro-
vides for nil taxes at source whereas the R–T tax
treaty contains a clause equivalent to Article 23A(1)
of the OECD Model that deals with the exemption
method. In this situation, State S will not be able to
tax the interest, State T will tax the interest at 9%
and State R will exempt the income from taxation.54
Now assume that the R–S tax treaty has adopted the
clause proposed by Article 10 of the MLI.55 In this
situation, RCO may not be extended treaty benefits
pursuant to Article 10(1) as the tax imposed in State
T is less than 60% of the tax imposed in State R on
that interest income.56 Also, RCO may not satisfy
the active conduct test contained in Article 10(2) as
its PE is in the business of making and managing
investments.57 In these circumstances, the PE anti-
abuse rule will take precedence to deny treaty access
and the PPT (or guiding principle) will not apply.
19. All facts remaining the same, assume that the
corporate tax rate in State R is 12.5%. In this situa-
tion, treaty benefits will have to be extended to RCO
as the tax imposed in State T is more than 60% of the
tax imposed in State R on that interest income. Can
State S deny treaty benefits to RCO by applying the
PPT? In the author’s opinion, the PPT should not
apply to a fact pattern that falls under the scope of the
anti-abuse clause and in such situations the interpre-
tation doctrine of lex specialis derogat legi generali should
continue to apply58 (the guiding principle should
definitely not apply). Even if applied the author is of
the opinion that the subjective element of the test
should not be satisfied given the fact that RCO and
its branch are carrying out genuine business activities
(see section 3.4 of the previous contribution).
4 DOMESTIC ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULES
4.1 Types of Domestic Anti-Avoidance Rules
20. A distinction should be made between domestic
anti-avoidance rules that counteract treaty abuse59 (i.e.
deny treaty benefits when the taxpayer engages in
treaty or rule shopping or any scheme that is employed
to obtain treaty benefits inappropriately) and domestic
anti-avoidance rules that counteract abuse of domestic
law60 (such as rules that deny deductions to resident
taxpayers, impute income in the hands of resident
taxpayers or deem a resident taxpayer to alienate its
assets prior to its migration). The section focuses on the
former type of anti-avoidance rules.
4.2 Interaction of Domestic Anti-Avoidance
Rules with Tax Treaties
21. Treaty or rule shopping (or other forms of treaty
abuse) can be counteracted at the domestic law level
by judicial anti-abuse rules (such as substance over
form or economic substance,61 step transactions62 or
business purpose tests63 or other doctrines64), domes-
tic statutory GAARs65 or domestic SAARs (source
Notes
53 We assume that RCOs branch (PE) carries out financing activities such as loan creation or loan management activities for the entire multinational group and bears the
associated financing related risks.
54 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 163.
55 2016 OECD, Multilateral Convention, Art. 10; It should be noted that this clause is an optional clause that States may wish to apply to their Covered Tax Agreements. See
2016 OECD, Explanatory Statement to the Multilateral Convention, para. 145. Only a few countries have opted for this clause with respect to their covered tax
agreements. For instance, see the positions adopted by Argentina, Austria and Netherlands.
56 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, paras 165–166.
57 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 167.
58 Danon & Salome, MLI, s. 3.7.1.
59 The object of abuse in these situations is the provisions of the tax treaty. See De Broe, Luts, BEPS, at 125.
60 The object of abuse in these situations are the provisions of the domestic law. The treaty is used subsequently to neutralize the application of the domestic anti-avoidance
rule. See De Broe, Luts, BEPS, at 125.
61 See CHAND, Thesis, s. 3.2.2.
62 Ibid., s. 3.2.3.
63 Ibid., s. 3.2.4.
64 Ibid., s. 3.2.5 and 3.2.6.
65 Ibid., s. 3.3.
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State measures such as anti-treaty shopping rules/anti-
rule shopping rules66). The question arises as to how
do these rules interact with tax treaties? Although
discussing the interaction between domestic anti-
avoidance rules and tax treaties is beyond the scope
of this contribution, the OECD’s view on the inter-
action of domestic SAARs with tax treaties seems to
be different when compared to its own view on the
interaction of domestic statutory GAARs/judicial doc-
trines with tax treaties. With respect to the former,
the commentary does acknowledge that conflicts
could arise.67 This is illustrated through an example
that deals with transfer of residence.68 Nevertheless,
the commentary does indicate that the guiding prin-
ciple/PPT could be applied to deny the treaty benefit.
With respect to the latter, the commentary states that
in a vast majority of situations conflicts will not arise.
Specifically, in the context of domestic statutory
GAARs, the commentary states that conflicts will
not arise where the ‘main aspects of these domestic general
antiabuse rules are in conformity with’ the PPT or the
guiding principle (in case the treaty does not incor-
porate the PPT).69 Likewise, with respect to the
interaction of judicial doctrines with tax treaties, the
commentary states that having regard to the guiding
principle (or the PPT), ‘there will be no conflict between
tax conventions and judicial antiabuse doctrines or general
domestic anti-abuse rules’.70 The author states that
domestic law and treaty law are two different legal
spheres. The commentary on Article 1 seems to mix
these spheres by referring to the PPT and guiding
principle during its discussion on the interaction of
domestic anti-avoidance rules with tax treaties. Such
references to treaty anti-abuse rules create confusion.
22. In the author’s opinion, the application of judicial
anti-abuse rules, domestic statutoryGAARs or domestic
SAARs can have several ‘effects’ in treaty or rule shopping
situations (or other forms of treaty abuse). Whether or
not such ‘effects’ of applying domestic anti-abuse rules
conflict with a tax treaty depends on the wording and
purpose of the relevant treaty provision. If the domestic
anti-avoidance ‘effect’ does not square with the terms of
the tax treaty then the latter will prevail pursuant to
Article 26 of the VCLT that contains the ‘pacta sunt
servanda’ principle. In fact, in the opinion of the author,
when a domestic anti-avoidance rule is applied from the
source State’s perspective and its ‘effects’ lead to the
conclusion that (1) the taxpayer is redetermined71 (2)
the income is re-characterized72 or (3) a treaty benefit is
denied,73 in many situations, conflicts can arise between
domestic anti-avoidance rules and tax treaties that are
based on the OECD Model. Also, if such rules are
applied or introduced after the conclusion of the tax
treaty – a treaty override occurs.
23. This being said, the author states that if a tax
treaty has a safeguard clause, which authorizes a
State to apply domestic anti-avoidance rules, then
it cannot be argued that a conflict arises.74 In this
regard, particular attention should be given to issues
surrounding the scope of the safeguard clause and its
interpretation (static or ambulatory approach).75
Moreover, domestic anti-avoidance rules can be
used to interpret undefined treaty terms. This is
because Article 3(2) of the OECD Model makes a
reference to the domestic law of the State applying
the treaty. As domestic anti-avoidance rules form
part of the domestic tax law of the State applying
the treaty such rules can be called into play to give a
meaning to an undefined treaty term. Consequently,
if a domestic judicial doctrine, statutory GAAR or
even a SAAR is applied to give a meaning to an
undefined treaty term then that meaning will take
precedence.76 This position is of course subject to the
limitation that the ‘context’ (internal and external) of
Notes
66 Ibid., s. 3.4.2.1.
67 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 1, para. 70.
68 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 1, para. 74.
69 2003 OECD Comm. Art. 1, paras 22–22.1; 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 59 (Commentary in paras 26.3–26.4); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 1,
paras 76–77.
70 2003 OECD Comm. Art. 1, paras 22–22.1; 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 59 (Commentary in paras 26.5–26.7); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 1,
paras 78–80.
71 See Chand, Thesis, Ch. 13.
72 Ibid., Ch. 14.
73 Ibid., Ch. 15.
74 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 1, para. 72 and para. 77.
75 Ibid., Ch. 10.
76 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 1, para. 73 and para. 77.
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the tax treaty and/or the interpretation principles of
the VCLT may not require a reference to a domestic
law provision.77
24. There is no doubt that several issues arise from
the application of domestic anti-abuse rules to cross
border situations that are governed by tax treaties.
Therefore, domestic anti-abuse rules should not be
used to counter treaty abuse. Specifically, they should
not be used because such rules express unilateral appli-
cation of the domestic law. Such unilateral application
could reallocate taxing rights and lead to double taxa-
tion (juridical or economic). Consequently, the applica-
tion of tax treaties becomes less certain and more
controversial when domestic anti-abuse rules are
applied. Accordingly, it is recommended that only
treaty anti-abuse rules be used to counter treaty
abuse. In other words, treaty abuse (treaty shopping,
rule shopping or other similar schemes) should be
counteracted only by treaty measures such as the
PPT, LOB clause or other targeted SAARs. This is
because such rules, when incorporated in tax treaties,
express the common intentions of the treaty partners.
With respect to the implementation of the minimum
standard, the OECD had suggested States to apply the
detailed LOB clause coupled with either a treaty anti-
abuse rule or domestic anti-abuse measures to counter-
act conduit financing. In light of the foregoing discus-
sion, in the author’s opinion, States should not use
domestic anti-abuse rules to counter treaty abuse
when they opt for the detailed LOB clause.
5 KEY CONCLUSIONS
25. The PPT (if incorporated in a tax treaty) will
prevail over the inherent anti-abuse rule. Further, as
a result of the compatibility clause, the PPT will
replace existing treaty GAARs that have a broad/
restricted scope. Moreover, as demonstrated, it is
submitted that the PPT (and the guiding principle)
should not apply to fact patterns that are covered by
other treaty SAARs. Also, going forward, issues with
respect to intermediary companies (as well as
arrangements with such companies) should be ana-
lysed under the PPT (or guiding principle – till the
extent relevant) as opposed to the beneficial owner-
ship clause. On the other hand, domestic anti-abuse
rules should not be used to counter treaty abuse as
they could conflict with treaty provisions. Moreover,
such rules could reallocate taxing rights and lead to
double taxation (juridical or economic).
Consequently, the application of tax treaties becomes
less certain and more controversial. Therefore, it is
recommended that only treaty anti-abuse rules be
used to counter treaty abuse. Of course, whether or
not the treaty anti-abuse rule is applicable will
depend on the precise facts and circumstances of
each situation.
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